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A Review of Sociological Issues in Fire Safety Regulation 
 
ABSTRACT 
This communication presents an overview of contemporary sociological issues in fire safety. The 
most obviously social aspects of fire safety – those that relate to the socioeconomic distribution of 
fire casualties and damage – are discussed first. The means that society uses to mitigate fire risks 
through regulation are treated next; focusing on the shift towards fire engineered solutions and the 
particular challenges this poses for the social distribution and communication of fire safety 
knowledge and expertise. Finally, the social construction of fire safety knowledge is discussed, 
raising questions about whether the confidence in the application of this knowledge by the full range 
of participants in the fire safety design and approvals process is always justified, given the specific 
assumptions involved in both the production of the knowledge and its extension to applications 
significantly removed from the original knowledge production; and the requisite competence that is 
therefore needed to apply this knowledge. The overarching objective is to argue that the fire safety 
professions ought to be more reflexive and informed about the nature of the knowledge and expertise 
that they develop and apply, and to suggest that fire safety scientists and engineers ought to actively 
collaborate with social scientists in research designed to study the way people interact with fire safety 
technology.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Fire safety knowledge and engineering expertise has advanced a great deal over the last few decades. 
Specialist journals report the latest findings; sophisticated simulation models provide tools for 
modelling fire, smoke, evacuation, and structural outcomes; and ambitious new buildings incorporate 
innovative designs that push forward the boundaries of fire safety engineering and question the limits 
and applicability of conventional prescriptive design guidance. In many parts of the world, fire deaths 
have also seen a steady decline over these recent decades [1].  
However, a sociological perspective requires us to look beneath the surface, and ask hard 
questions about the depth, nature, and rigor of fire safety knowledge, and the mechanisms through 
which existing knowledge is applied in practice. Here our focus is on perspectives from the sociology 
of scientific knowledge and the sociology of technology that elucidate the social factors that are 
central to both knowledge production, and its dissemination and application [e.g. 2-7]. These 
perspectives are particularly apposite to fire safety because they emphasise the contingent nature of 
knowledge claims (e.g. in judging whether test results are sufficiently representative) and the effects 
of social organisation on technological practice (e.g. how regulatory practices affect fire safety 
implementation). Adopting a sociological perspective, in which we seek to understand the role of 
social factors in fire safety, helps us to address some key issues. Do fire safety solutions take sufficient 
account of social context? Can we develop better ways to learn and apply the lessons of fire disasters? 
Do the fire safety professions truly understand (and thus deliver on) society’s expectations with 
respect to fire safety? Do all stakeholders have sufficient understanding of the fundamentals of fire 
safety to underpin the regulatory shift towards performance based design? Indeed, can fire ‘safety’ 
be rigorously quantified? And if not, are current practices increasing risk or leading to excessive and 
expensive fire safety measures? In general, what can be done to enhance the development and uptake 
of fire safety science and to further promote best practice across fire safety engineering? 
A classic response to these questions would be to call for greater levels of research funding to 
increase the scientific and technical knowledge base available for fire safety designers, regulators, 
and practitioners. But clearly if existing knowledge is not being properly exploited by all requisite 
stakeholders, or if fire safety research fails to lead to real progress, then further engineering research 
alone cannot lead to optimised outcomes in practice. Instead it is worth considering the possibility 
that making additional progress in fire safety may depend, at least in part, on a deeper understanding 
of both the social nature and social context of the problem.  
Our aim is to argue for all fire safety specialists to reflect more on the nature of the knowledge 
and expertise that they develop and apply. What follows is a working through of sociological 
perspectives on fire safety that is not intended to criticize or judge current stakeholders (fire safety 
engineers in particular), but rather to stimulate reflection. We seek to open up debates, rather than 
close them off; to pose questions, rather than answer them. It is also noteworthy that many of the 
ideas and questions raised have relevance for other forms of engineering, for instance structural 
engineering, however to different degrees and in subtly different ways. 
Given that both fire risks and fire protection measures are all around us in the built 
environment, the essentially social nature of fire safety is obvious at one level. Fires are not only 
often the result of human activities, but also the way that fires develop, and the extent to which people 
react and are able to escape, all hinge on human behaviour and on social (and economic) organization. 
In addition, implementation of fire safety measures and understanding of the underlying processes 
have strong social components. What follows makes the case for a sociology of fire safety, arguing 
that all aspects of fire safety are inherently social in nature, or are fundamentally influenced by social 
factors, and that an understanding of the ways in which this shapes the provision of fire safety will 
help scientists and engineers to more effectively use (and improve) their technical knowledge. 
Although many of the points we make are not novel individually, we believe this to be an original 
comprehensive synthesis of the role of social factors in fire safety that we have identified within the 
literature and the fire safety engineering professions. The common thread that runs through this paper 
is our focus on the processes by which the disparate sources of fire safety knowledge (from statistics, 
fire investigations, experiments and tests, and first principles calculations) are assembled and made 
use of in fire safety engineering. 
We begin with some obviously social aspects of fire safety that relate to the socioeconomic 
distribution of fire casualties and damage (it is perhaps telling that historically most of the buildings 
in question are those that had the least explicit involvement of fire safety professionals in their 
construction and maintenance). Next we describe how society has sought to mitigate fire risks through 
regulation, and how the current shift towards fire engineered solutions poses particular challenges for 
the social distribution and communication of fire safety knowledge and expertise. In particular, the 
partial displacement of prescriptive regulatory approaches appears to shift responsibility towards 
forms of self-regulation that depend on the professionalism and technical competence of fire safety 
engineers, but it is not yet clear that the profession as a whole has fully embraced appropriate 
mechanisms for accreditation to ensure sufficiently high standards across the industry [8], or indeed 
whether self-regulation is well-suited to a form of risk that is infrequent, uncertain, and probabilistic 
in nature. Finally, we discuss the social construction of fire safety knowledge, raising questions about 
whether the level of confidence in the application and approval of this knowledge is optimal given 
the specific assumptions involved in both the production of the knowledge and its extension to 
applications that may be somewhat removed from the original knowledge production. 
2.0  PART I: FIRE IN SOCIETY 
2.1 Socio-economic factors and fire outcomes 
The pervasive social nature of fire risks and solutions is easily observed. Our built 
environment offers many benefits but also brings with it risks, including those from fire. These risks 
can be ameliorated through technical means (e.g. the design of buildings and the materials used), but 
in many cases human behaviour remains central to both fire initiation and to outcomes. In particular, 
socioeconomic circumstances play a major role, with most fire deaths occurring in domestic settings, 
and rates of fires and casualties correlated with socioeconomic status [9]. Generally speaking, fire 
deaths are decreasing in Europe, North America, and some other jurisdictions (though fire statistics 
remain limited or lacking in many parts of the world). For example, in 2013-14 the United Kingdom 
saw 322 fire-related deaths, the lowest figure for the last 50 years (for comparison there were 1775 
deaths due to road accidents in 2014), in keeping with a general downward trend over recent years 
(the highpoint was 967 deaths in 1985-86) [10]; for road deaths as a comparator, see [11]. Non-fatal 
fire casualties have seen a similar reduction in recent decades.  
Of the 322 UK deaths in 2013-14, 80% were due to fires in dwellings, with only 17 in other 
buildings (fewer than in road vehicles or outdoors)[10]. In addition, the proportion of dwelling fires 
that led to death was much greater than for other buildings, including other types of residential 
buildings (e.g. care homes, hotels and hostels) with 6.6 deaths per 1000 dwelling fires compared to 
1.0 per 1000 for other building types [10].  
There was also significant variation in fire deaths between countries in the UK, with Scotland 
having the highest rate at around 6 deaths per million of population compared to 5.5 in Wales and 5.1 
in England [10]. It is noteworthy that Scottish fire statistics highlight alcohol and/or drugs as a 
significant factor. Over the three years 2009-10 to 2011-12, 44 out of a total of 138 fire deaths in 
Scotland were associated with suspected alcohol or drug use [12]. 
The recent history of domestic fire safety in the UK and elsewhere shows that simple and 
inexpensive solutions can be very effective, if they are installed, operated, and maintained correctly. 
One of the most significant changes in the UK in recent years has been the installation of smoke 
alarms in dwellings. The proportion of households with smoke alarms increased from 8% in 1988 to 
88% in 2011 [10]. Working smoke alarms are clearly associated with lower rates of death. For 
example, in 2013-14 the death rate in fires was 4 per 1000 for fires that were detected by an alarm 
compared to 8 per 1000 for undetected fires [10]. US data show a similar pattern, with death rates for 
reported fires about half for fires in homes that had a working smoke alarm compared to those in 
homes that did not [13]. Socioeconomic factors may also influence uptake of such technologies, and 
additional research in this area may be warranted. 
‘Chip’ pans may also be increasingly uncommon, with British fires arising from this cause 
declining by more than 75% in the ten years up to 2011-12 (an unintended consequence of the 
emergence of chips that can be oven-cooked), however cooking appliances remain the largest cause 
of dwelling fires [10]. Nonetheless, cooking related fires only accounted for 30 UK fatalities out of 
the 322 total, which might ‘reflect the relatively minor nature of many cooking-related fires and the 
fact that many cooking fires occur when the victims are alert at the time of the fire’ [10]. In cases of 
fire deaths in dwellings, cigarettes have been identified as the most important cause of ignition, 
accounting for over a third of UK fatalities in 2013-14 [10]. 
US data again show similar patterns, with 84% of civilian (i.e. non-fire service) deaths in 2014 
attributed to dwelling fires [14]. From a peak of 6015 in 1978, US domestic fire deaths had dropped 
to 2745 in 2014, though the decline over the years has been neither smooth nor continuous [14]. 
Alongside these broad historical trends are comparative data that strongly suggest 
socioeconomic explanations for fire outcomes. Studies of US cities according to census areas show 
that those areas with the lowest average incomes have the highest rates of fire [15]. A wide range of 
factors showed some significant correlation with fire rates – including home ownership, education 
levels, numbers of one parent families, and race – but these were all also strongly related to income. 
If analysed from the viewpoint of neighbourhoods then areas suffering from economic decline, with 
higher levels of abandoned buildings, are particularly at risk, as accidental fires are likely to have 
more severe consequences and arson is more likely to occur [15]. 
Major US cities have long suffered from high levels of arson. For example, in 1994 arson was 
the biggest cause of fire deaths in US metropolitan areas [15]. Changes in the urban landscape in the 
US – both what has been called the ‘white flight’ to the suburbs that began in the 1950s and the more 
recent decline in old manufacturing industries – have left many urban areas with very low average 
incomes. As a recent example, Detroit suffered an estimated 5000 arson fires in 2012, though the 
figure is necessarily approximate because the Detroit Fire Department only had sufficient resources 
to investigate about one in five suspicious fires [16]. Likewise in the UK, overall levels of arson mask 
much higher regional variations. Nationally, according to data collected by the British fire services 
on fires they were called to, about 12% of dwelling fires were started deliberately [10]. However, in 
2013 the Cleveland Fire Brigade [17] reported that seven out of ten fires in their jurisdiction were the 
result of arson, a figure matched by those for Wales in 2010/11. A 2003 survey of arson in England 
and Wales claimed that since the early 1990s 1200 deaths and 32000 injuries had been caused by 
arson, with an average week resulting in one death and 55 injuries [18]. 
The causes of arson are clearly social. In a city like Detroit many cases are likely to result 
from attempts to claim insurance for properties that are no longer saleable, as well as from disaffection 
with the state of neighbourhoods. In other cases, for example arson attacks on schools, the more 
specific social issues concerning the alienation of young people are likely to be involved, and in the 
UK most arson interventions are aimed at modifying the behaviour of young people [18]. 
Statistics such as those presented here constitute an important source of knowledge about fire 
safety, with the proviso that their value is heavily dependent on the way that the original data are 
collected. Moreover, such statistics simply show correlations that are indicative of problems and 
solutions rather than demonstrating cause and effect. Nevertheless, it is widely believed that the fire 
problem is greater in the poorer economies of the world, and particularly in informal settlements, and 
better data collection and statistical analysis would be an important step towards addressing this 
problem. 
2.2 Taking account of ‘the social’ in technical solutions 
These statistics pose challenges for scientists and engineers. The strong correlation of 
socioeconomic factors with fire incidents and casualties may lead one to suggest that these types of 
fire safety issues should be considered ‘social’ rather than ‘technical’, and therefore outside the remit 
of scientific and engineering approaches to fire safety. However, this could be seen as a dereliction 
of social responsibility and would also require a revisionist account of the history of fire safety. 
‘Socio-technical’ expertise has played a major part in historical fire safety advances, and this tradition 
ought to continue whilst adapting to changing circumstances in the built environment. Technical 
solutions cannot necessarily make people behave better (though a harmonious built environment may 
help), but they may ameliorate the outcomes of people behaving badly. 
In practice, tackling the social stratification of fire risks may be more a matter of political will, 
economic priorities, and good governance, than devising new technical solutions; notwithstanding 
the cases where technical solutions are informed by, and sensitive to, social considerations. Societal 
perceptions of risk are complex in nature, with many factors influencing how people view risks and 
the extent to which they act to mitigate them (individually, organizationally, and politically) [19, 20]. 
Risks can of course be quantified and calculated, as with the risk assessments carried out by industries 
such as nuclear power [21], or indirectly through cost-benefit analyses performed to inform decisions 
about fire safety measures such as domestic sprinklers [22]. However, when it comes to complex and 
rare events, these kinds of risk calculations typically involve a sufficient number of questionable 
assumptions about the relevant inputs for their results to be ignorable where convenient, on account 
of political, organizational, or individual beliefs and interests. 
More, and more detailed and reliable, fire statistics would help bolster evidence-based 
decision-making. At present many countries have inadequate or no formalized systems for collecting 
such data. Although existing solutions – such as smoke alarms and compartmentalization – can reduce 
casualties in certain situations, the evidence on which to base policy decisions is often limited (and 
therefore contested). Much depends on the interaction of human behaviour with technology (e.g. 
making sure smoke alarms are working; for a study of why smoke alarms are not maintained, or even 
turned off, see [23]), and evidence-based decision making about such technologies requires 
comprehensive study of fire safety features in situ. It is thus worth asking whether fire safety scientists 
and engineers could obtain more realistic data through collaboration with social scientists in research 
designed to study the way people interact with fire safety technology. In this way the fire safety 
community could provide better data on the effectiveness (and cost-effectiveness) of different 
technical approaches, while recognising that regulatory frameworks and policy initiatives are unlikely 
to be driven purely by evidence (and acknowledging that such evidence can never be purely 
‘technical’, especially if cost assumptions are involved). Some technical solutions – for instance 
sprinklers in domestic properties – may have public and political appeal as well as strong commercial 
backing, even though the evidence over their cost-effectiveness remains contested. Studies of 
sprinkler effectiveness are generally econometric in nature and assume that sprinklers will reduce fire 
size and thus reduce casualties. Such studies are dependent on the cost assumptions used, including 
those that vary according to local calculations of how life is valued. For example, a BRE report on 
‘Cost Benefit Analysis of Residential Sprinklers for Wales’ prepared for the Welsh Government 
concluded that, ‘fitting sprinklers in all new residential premises in Wales is not cost effective’ [22]. 
In contrast, an earlier New Zealand study found residential sprinklers to be generally cost-effective 
[24]. 
3.0  PART II: REGULATION 
3.1  Regulation by prescriptive rules 
Traditionally a key factor in reducing fire safety risk has been society’s capacity to regulate building 
activities to reduce fire related risks in the resulting structures (and communities). Regulations have 
often emerged as piecemeal responses to particular fire disasters, building up over the years into a 
comprehensive set of necessarily approximate buildings codes that prescribe rules and guidelines 
according to the type, location, occupancy, and use of buildings.  
To quote the classic example, the 1666 Great Fire of London led to King Charles II’s famous 
declaration that ‘no man whatsoever shal presume to erect any House or Building, great or smal, but 
of Brick or Stone, and if any man shal do the contrary, the next Magistrate shal forthwith cause it to 
be pulled down’, and that ‘all other eminent and notorious Streets, shal be of such a breadth, as may 
with Gods blessing prevent the mischief that one side may suffer if the other be on fire’ [25]. The 
Rebuilding of London Act 1666 set out more detailed building regulations, affirming the requirement 
that brick or stone should be the main building materials, and setting out specific requirements for 
the width of walls (including party walls) according to the type of building. Such historical regulations 
have (and in some cases still do) profoundly influenced the very fabric of urban environments in the 
developed world. 
Many regulations that persist in some form or other to the present day stem from such long 
past events, sometimes in circumstances that may no longer pertain. In some cases, such as the 
requirement for a fire evacuation time of no more than 2½ minutes, anecdotally stemming from the 
time taken to play the UK national anthem during a 1911 fire at Edinburgh’s Empire Palace Theatre, 
the origins of regulations may appear to be particularly idiosyncratic [26]. Nevertheless, many of the 
rules that resulted have since proven themselves to be useful and defensible in hindsight. 
Sometimes these rules have taken the form of sweeping, common-sense solutions lacking a 
detailed scientific understanding of the particular fire safety problem, but sometimes – as with 
examples such as the Piper Alpha or King's Cross fires – the regulatory changes have been based on 
in-depth analysis [27, 28]. These building codes appear to have served society well in reducing fire 
damage, deaths, and injuries [1], with a focus on four main issues to ensure life safety: (1) evacuation, 
(2) fire and smoke containment, (3) fire-fighting access and facilities, and (4) structural collapse 
prevention. For example, the five requirements in British building regulations cover these four main 
areas [29]. However, to the knowledge of the authors, an element that is lacking in the literature is an 
in-depth analysis of the costs and economic implications of these regulatory requirements. 
3.2 Social interests and regulation 
It is important to note that society’s responses to fire disasters are mediated by politics, and 
often complicated by the considerable challenge of retrospective analysis based on limited data. For 
example, following the 1906 San Francisco earthquake/fire, concern about the effect that being 
labelled an earthquake zone would have on investment led local business, media, and government to 
launch a concerted campaign to emphasise the fire, which was considered to be preventable, and 
downplay the earthquake, which was not. Thus the San Francisco Real Estate Board explicitly agreed 
that no mention should be made of ‘the great earthquake;’ instead it would be known as ‘the great 
fire’ [30]. Geologists interested in investigating what had happened ‘were advised and even urged 
over and over again to gather no such information, and above all not to publish it’ [31]. 
In addition, attempts to understand whether ‘the inadequacy of fireproof covering’ was a 
factor in building collapse after the earthquake, an already challenging task given the general level of 
destruction, were confounded by the damage caused by the dynamiting used in an attempt to create 
firebreaks. Sent to investigate, Captain John Stephen Sewell of the United States Engineers Office 
complained that it ‘was not possible, in the majority of cases, for me to get the debris out of the way, 
and satisfy myself by a personal observation, as to whether the damage was done by fire or by 
dynamite’ [30]. The oft-cited statistics that reported 10% earthquake damage and 90% fire damage 
came from a compromise about how much insurance companies were prepared to pay (as earthquake 
damage and resulting fires were typically not covered), and not from any actual measurement of 
damage [30]. Moreover, the framing of the disaster as being primarily a fire disaster led to the main 
response being the responsibility of the city Fire Department, and thus directed at improving fire 
fighting capabilities rather than the ability of buildings to withstand fire (or indeed earthquake). While 
water supplies were greatly improved, the rush to rebuild meant building regulations were neither 
consistently strengthened nor rigorously applied  in the years that followed [32]. 
As this example shows, perhaps to an unusual extent, the impetus for regulation driven by 
major fires does not occur in a social vacuum. Fire disasters not only led to building regulations; they 
also led to the development of fire prevention technologies, and to the establishment of fire and rescue 
services and the infrastructure to fight fires. Given their important role, the fire and rescue services 
became established as a de-facto source of expertise, as well as an important lobbying power. The 
fire safety industry too gradually became a significant social group, with interests in influencing fire 
safety regulation.  
Industry’s role has often been beneficial. For example, the desire by US insurance companies 
to standardize the implementation of sprinkler systems led to the formation of the National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) in the 1890s, with subsequent reductions in fire losses, particularly 
in industrial buildings. In a similar manner, the specialist insurance provider FM Global has for many 
years operated one of the world’s major fire research laboratories, producing knowledge of use 
beyond FM Global’s primary insurance remit.  
However, commercial interests cannot be presumed to be entirely benign in their influence, 
nor, moreover, should they be seen as a unified lobby group. In particular, it is possible to characterize 
industry groupings according to types of product, such as ‘steel’ versus ‘concrete,’ and ‘active’ versus 
‘passive’ approaches to fire safety. These competing commercial interests are potentially important 
in the way that they seek to influence the ‘code committees’ that formulate new regulatory guidelines 
and standards.  
3.3 The limits of prescription 
Prescriptive codes have generally served societies well. For any particular class of building, 
prescriptive codes impose specific requirements for fire safety measures that are deemed to satisfy 
societal requirements for safety. However, the standardization of prescriptive design solutions and 
the prevalence of common sense derivations and observation-based solutions are necessarily 
accompanied by coarse approximations and a comparatively large margin of safety, sometimes with 
limited use of scientific understanding. Thus, the unthinking use of prescriptive codes has attracted 
criticism because such an approach may make buildings more expensive than they might otherwise 
be, is less responsive to changing circumstances, and can be inflexible as regards individual design 
situations. Prescriptive design solutions, using necessarily simplified design tools, may either waste 
resources or fail to provide the expected level of safety if used where they are not strictly applicable. 
Thus, one source of pressure for a move away from prescriptive codes has come from political and 
commercial influences that seek to apply increasing fire safety knowledge in the interests of 
deregulation. 
It is also worth noting that the very success of prescriptive codes in reducing fire deaths 
paradoxically undermines a key aspect of an approach based on learning from disasters. With major 
fire incidents becoming less common, there is less feedback to update the regulations. If, as Drysdale 
[33] has put it, ‘Progress relied on lessons learned from failure’, then fewer major fires might mean 
fewer lessons learned. Although knowledge has advanced greatly since the Great Fire of London, and 
crude pragmatic responses may no longer be appropriate, there is still an imperative to learn from 
fires because they provide the most authentic feedback regarding potential failings in fire safety 
measures or design. They also serve to identify any new design weaknesses introduced because of 
other innovations in the built environment.  
Given the (thankfully) limited numbers of major fires in many jurisdictions, our ability to 
learn these lessons is limited. Rather than fire investigation remaining a local matter, it would be 
useful to have an international, industry-wide approach to coordinate learning from all major fires 
wherever they occur, perhaps in a manner analogous to the way that major airliner crashes are 
investigated by local jurisdictions, but under the international standards and practices set out in the 
International Civil Aviation Organization Annex 13 [34]. In a parallel field, the Institution of 
Structural Engineers oversees an Earthquake Engineering Field Investigation Team (EEFIT), which 
is a group of structural engineers who visit major earthquake sites globally and report on building 
seismic performance. Thus, when it comes to earthquakes and structural engineering there exists an 
explicit feedback loop. However, while some fire engineering case studies are reported publically 
and in the literature, there is no “FEFIT” group for Fire Engineering and thus no similarly coordinated 
feedback for the benefit of the Fire Safety Engineering community. 
The absence of detailed and recurring empirical feedback on fire safety outcomes leaves a 
knowledge gap that has been filled in part by Fire Safety Science. Advances in fundamental 
understanding of fire phenomena, in human behaviour, and in structural responses to fire, have 
enabled a gradual shift in the nature of fire safety regulation. The claim is that if fire safety solutions 
can be designed and assessed according to the latest knowledge, rather than required to meet historic 
prescriptive rules, then buildings can be more innovative, more functional, more sustainable, and 
safer – given that their safety level may be established rather than deemed, and possibly even 
enhanced through this assessment. Moreover, tolerances can be judged more finely, and unnecessary 
margins of safety reduced. 
This shift towards functional objectives is embodied not only in more science-driven 
prescriptive rules, but also in the increasing use of ‘fire engineered solutions,’ or what is widely (if 
imprecisely) described as Performance Based Designs (PBD). While fire safety design has always 
been undertaken with the objective of providing an adequate level of building performance in fire, 
modern performance based design seeks to use the best available knowledge to find the best fire 
safety strategy that results in the most efficient building, without sacrificing the societally tolerable 
level of fire hazard. As defined by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO/TC92/SC4), fire safety engineering is: ‘The application of engineering principles, rules and 
expert judgment based on a scientific appreciation of the fire phenomena, of the effects of fire, and 
of the reaction and behaviour of people, in order to: (a) save life, protect property and preserve the 
environment and heritage; (b) quantify the hazards and risks of fire and its effects; (c) evaluate 
analytically the optimum protective and preventative measures necessary to limit, within prescribed 
levels, the consequences of fire’ (quoted in [35]).  
However, increased use of PBD solutions rather than adherence to simple rules may also 
present challenges. In particular, it raises important questions about the extent to which fire safety 
knowledge is understood and used by all of those involved in the design, construction, and 
operation/management processes, where responsibility for regulation lies, and about how the fire 
safety community understands and quantifies the level of acceptable fire hazard. 
3.4  The challenges of performance engineering   
The crux of the critique of a predominantly prescriptive approach to building design and regulation 
is that prescriptive rules are often rooted in long-past historical events, and despite regular updating 
may have not kept up with innovations in design and construction. New building techniques and 
materials could thus mean that current prescriptive rules no longer achieve the assumed level of fire 
safety. As Brannigan has noted: ‘Buildings codes make buildings legal; they do not make them safe’ 
(for example, in his presentation at the Lloyd’s Register Foundation/University of Edinburgh Seminar 
in Fire Safety Engineering, Gullane, Scotland, April 30, 2013). In addition, prescriptive regulations 
are seen to impose unnecessary requirements that may inhibit innovation, or add unnecessary costs.  
By the second half of the twentieth century, prescriptive fire design rules specified, in 
considerable detail, what was required for particular classes of buildings. For example, by the end of 
the 1970s the building regulations for England and Wales totalled 307 pages of guidance, and were, 
as described by Law, ‘very prescriptive and understood mainly by lawyers’ [36]. The latest US 
(mostly prescriptive) fire codes found in the International Building Code (IBC) now total over 700 
pages. In some cases (e.g. the British rule that a horizontal escape route should not be within 4.5m of 
an opening such as an escalator or atrium [37]) the precise origins and logic of the prescriptive rules 
(sometimes referred to as ‘magic numbers’) are unknown even to many skilled fire safety engineering 
practitioners [38]. 
In principle, British regulations have become less prescriptive since the Building Act 1984, 
which came into force in late 1985. However, although the guidance provided in the resulting 
regulations (e.g. as found in Approved Document B in England and Wales [37]) only recommends 
ways in which the fire safety requirements can be met, practitioners (both building control and fire 
brigades as regulators, and architects/engineers and their clients proposing schemes) have often 
followed the prescriptive rules in practice. Indeed, many fire safety practitioners still operate largely 
within a prescriptive framework because of a view (real or perceived) that following the stated rules 
provides reassurance to the regulators that fire safety standards are being upheld – i.e. that a tacitly 
agreed and historically demonstrated ‘level of safety’ has been achieved. For the engineers and their 
clients this may provide some reassurance that approval will be granted more quickly. This reduces 
the ‘approvals risk’ feared by developers, which appears to be a deterrent to stepping outside the 
directives of prescriptive design rules. 
Several jurisdictions (UK, USA, Australia, New Zealand, etc.) allow designers the option to 
deviate from prescriptive design rules through the use of PBD fire engineering approaches, though 
some (e.g. the USA) remain more prescriptive in practice than others. In some cases prescriptive rules 
may be followed except for those parts of a design where the guidelines are overly restrictive in 
inhibiting the architect’s vision, where the building site has physical limitations that cannot be 
accommodated by the prescriptive rules, or where a more performance based approach offers 
solutions that are clearly better (i.e. safer or more rational) or offer significant savings. 
Many authors have previously commented on the benefits and potential pitfalls of more 
performance based approaches to fire safety engineering design [e.g. 19, 20, 39-42], and have raised 
questions regarding the practical application of PBD in fire safety engineering, including issues such 
as: technical knowledge gaps and education needs [36, 39], differing perceptions of, and expectations 
around, mitigation of fire risks by different stakeholders [19, 20], quantification and demonstration 
of acceptable levels of ‘performance’ [20, 40], accountability in differing regulatory regimes [41], 
and politicization of decision making [42]. A particularly useful review of the relevant issues, some 
of which are discussed below, is given by Alvarez et al. [42]. 
In the case of prescriptive regulatory approaches, approval ultimately depends on adjudication 
by the authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) as regards its interpretation of the applicability and 
intentions of the rules. Not only can judgment be necessary to decide whether a specific rule is 
applicable to a particular project, but also the rules may require interpretation because, if too narrowly 
framed, they could be difficult to apply generally. However, this has led to criticisms such as that 
‘prescriptive guidance is awkward, ambiguous and complicated to use’ [43]. Hence the emergence of 
a professional group of fire safety code consultants, whose expertise is in interpreting and re-
interpreting the ‘intent’ of the rules to help clients navigate prescriptive codes. 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) tells us [e.g. 2-7] that social relations matter in such 
an approvals process because different individuals may take a different view on the intent of the same 
regulation, and good relationships and trust between players can smooth the process. Former fire 
service personnel are sometimes employed by engineering firms not just for what they know, but also 
for whom they know within the approvals process. And longstanding relationships can lead to 
regulators having trust in the competence of specific architects, engineers, and builders, thus enabling 
novel designs and strategies to be approved more easily.  
Whereas under a prescriptive approach the AHJ must interpret and adjudicate on the 
applicability and intention of specific fire code rules, with a PBD approach approvers are required to 
understand and adjudicate on fire safety knowledge claims and applications. In essence, a shift 
towards PBD marks a shift away from regulation based on judgements of the law, to regulation based 
on judgements of the laws of science. Being expert in application of the rules is necessary but no 
longer sufficient; being expert in the underlying science is now essential. However, this raises the 
obvious question of whether the traditional approval authorities for fire safety are (or can become) 
sufficiently expert in the fundamentals of fire safety science and its engineering application to provide 
the necessary oversight. In particular, we are faced with sociological questions of how knowledge 
claims about fire safety knowledge are constructed and assessed, and who is deemed competent to 
make such judgments. 
3.5 Deregulation and/or self-regulation?   
One solution would be to replace external regulation as we know it with some degree of self-
regulation. This has long been the practice in aviation regulation (admittedly an industry sector that 
is markedly different from fire safety in a number of regards), where it was recognised decades ago 
that the complexity of aircraft technology meant that regulators such as the US Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) could not stay abreast of the work of the manufacturers without incurring 
excessive costs. Instead, the FAA delegates much of its work to employees of the manufacturers, who 
it nominates as Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs) [44, 45]. In aviation this self-
regulation is considered satisfactory because major manufacturers such as Boeing and Airbus have a 
high reputational stake in preventing high profile accidents; any accidents that do occur are intensely 
studied with remedies applied, and airliner technologies have typically only seen gradual, incremental 
improvements from one generation to the next.  
Structural engineering provides another potential model. The work of structural engineers is 
not typically subject to detailed regulatory checks; rather structural engineers are trusted to be 
competent professionals. It is thus the people who are regulated, and not their work. This regulation 
takes the form of effective self-regulation based around the accreditation of structural engineering as 
a profession. Although the specifics vary between jurisdictions, this accreditation of structural 
engineers typically involves two components: education and experience. If a structural engineer is 
judged to have completed the requisite educational qualifications and accrued sufficient relevant 
experience, then they are deemed competent by virtue of the resulting accreditation, and this means 
that they can practise their profession in that jurisdiction. In many jurisdictions there may also be a 
requirement for continuing professional development. 
Fire safety engineers could be (and indeed in some jurisdictions are) accorded the same status 
as self-regulating competent professionals; in the UK for example a significant step towards this came 
in 1996 when the Institution of Fire Engineers (IFE) was licensed by the UK Engineering Council to 
register members with the appropriate professional status according to their educational and 
experiential standing [46]. However, a number of factors may explain why regulation continues to 
remain focussed on the quality of fire safety projects rather than on the formal accreditation of the 
engineers responsible for them. Not only is fire engineering a less mature profession than structural 
engineering, but also its potential failures may be less visible, and thus provide less feedback, both 
as regards identifying the individuals responsible and in terms of informing the profession as a whole. 
Significant fires are (thankfully) rare and may be poorly interrogated to gain useful engineering 
design feedback, and so fire safety engineering features may lie dormant throughout the whole 
lifetime of a building and possibly be overlooked even when a fire occurs, whereas deficiencies in 
structural engineering are likely to be exposed (unless they relate to low probability events such as 
severe seismic or terrorist events). 
3.6 Regulatory expertise and PBD 
In any case, whatever the merits of further professionalization of fire safety engineering, the 
current situation is that regulators typically continue to evaluate fire safety designs. That being the 
case, the increasing use of performance based fire safety solutions raises two pertinent challenges for 
regulatory oversight: (1) whether some jurisdictions have enabled performance based design in such 
a way as to allow too much discretion for local negotiation about what level of ‘safety’ is considered 
adequate; and (2) whether approvers (or other design stakeholders) have sufficient expertise to assess 
the merits of fire engineering designs.  
On the first point, traditional prescriptive building regulations could be seen as reflecting the 
‘revealed preferences’ of society in that they are the cumulative result of local governance, reflecting 
what was considered acceptable in any particular jurisdiction and reasonable given engineering 
practice, albeit influenced by commercial and other interests [20]. The guidance that underpins these 
regulations is couched in quantitative (although not necessarily unproblematic) requirements. 
However, the shift towards performance based design solutions has in some cases replaced such 
quantitative guidelines with more qualitative or negotiable judgements about what constitutes a 
‘satisfactory’ or ‘adequate’ (two common words used in legislation) level of performance. 
For example, the performance based design option outlined in the US National Fire Protection 
Life Safety Code NFPA101 has previously been criticized because: 
… the scenarios and supporting performance clauses of the code are very qualitative in nature and 
do not provide quantitative advice about the design fire, acceptance criteria, or methodology but 
simply outline all the factors that should be considered by a designer without actually quantifying 
any of the necessary input parameters or acceptance criteria. This leaves the designer having to 
develop their own criteria and design input with the approval of the authority having jurisdiction 
(AHJ) [47]. 
In practice design criteria may be established by direct reference to existing prescriptive 
regulations, so that performance based solutions are permitted so long as they are seen to achieve the 
same ‘outcome’ or ‘level’ with regard to fire safety. Thus, although UK building regulations ceased 
to have mandatory prescriptive requirements in 1985, the guidelines (e.g. as contained in Approved 
Document B) continue to be used by some designers as though they were prescriptive requirements, 
thus setting a baseline against which the adequacy of engineered (i.e. performance based) fire 
solutions is sometimes judged. 
Likewise, US jurisdictions often require performance based solutions to be judged by 
comparison against the presumed adequacy of the prescriptive codes, and are sometimes developed 
using prescriptive assumptions. The IBC explicitly permits ‘alternative materials, design and methods 
of construction and equipment’, but requires that these are ‘not less than the equivalent of that 
prescribed’ in the code [48]. In other words, fire safety can be achieved by different means than those 
specified in the codes so long as the same overall level of safety is achieved. However, this approach 
can be problematic because the prescriptive code requirements may not have been originally 
developed with any rational quantification of safety levels, thus making such comparisons difficult 
[49]. 
This issue has attracted most attention in New Zealand, where a ‘perceived deficiency’ in the 
regulatory framework introduced in the early 1990s was ‘the lack of clear guidance from the regulator 
for performance criteria and design fire characteristics and scenarios for use in performance-based 
design’ [50]. In some cases, this left the determination of what counted as ‘adequate’ safety dependent 
on local negotiation between designers and the AHJ: 
The parameters used within a performance-based design such as the design scenarios, design fires 
and acceptance criteria are suggested by the designer with the acceptance of the AHJ, which can 
lead to inconsistent levels of safety being achieved for the design of similar buildings [45]. 
As a result of dissatisfaction with its building regulations (partly driven by a nationwide scandal 
concerning inappropriate construction techniques leading to ‘leaky buildings’), New Zealand 
introduced a major reform of its building codes in 2013. To reduce the potential for inappropriate and 
inconsistent outcomes the new regulations specify both the inputs and outputs for performance based 
design solutions in a more rigidly prescribed framework with specified verification methods [51]. 
The aim was to reduce reliance on negotiation and judgment, and instead to prescribe a framework 
for how performance should be judged with measurable outputs based on fire safety science that 
provide a more ‘consistent level’ of fire safety [52]. 
However, even with such a partially prescriptive approach there remains in performance based 
design a fundamental shift in the role of expertise and knowledge claims. Within a traditional 
prescriptive framework the regulators could reasonably claim (perhaps incorrectly in some cases) that 
they had the appropriate expertise to adjudicate on how the regulatory guidelines should be 
implemented. Although there was scope for interpretation, regulation could arguably be done as a 
‘box-ticking’ exercise, checking compliance with prescriptive rules rather than the assumptions on 
which they are based, and carried out by ‘code-checkers’. In a performance based approach regulators 
are faced with requests to approve fire safety solutions potentially based on complex knowledge 
claims that are rooted in science. 
Regulation of performance based designs thus depends not just on the relationship between the 
regulator and the regulated, but also on the levels of expertise, competence, and professionalism of 
those involved. Ideally, regulators should be able to understand the analysis that is used to support 
the fire safety approach proposed. In some cases the regulators will have sufficient expertise either to 
review design submissions themselves, or to know that they need outside expertise (i.e. third party 
review) to help. However, in other cases regulators with limited expertise may insist on adherence to 
the prescriptive rules so as to remain within their comfort zone, and such an approach can be 
reinforced if the fire services (who may also be key actors in the approvals process, whether formally 
or not) also lack sufficient technical expertise and are unwilling or unable to seek external technical 
advice. 
Lack of approver expertise can thus prevent approval of projects with performance based fire 
safety features, but it could also permit approval of projects that are potentially unsafe. Performance 
based design enables designers to engineer around traditional regulations, but therefore requires fire 
safety knowledge to be applied professionally. However, if fire safety engineering is practiced by 
engineers who are not fire safety experts (that is to say, if professional accreditation and competency 
awareness is weak) then there is a risk that poor design solutions could be approved if the approver 
also lacks sufficient expertise. Because fire safety engineering relies on several disciplinary domains 
(e.g. egress, fire development, structural behaviour), it is also crucial that practitioners do not claim 
expertise outside of their core competencies. 
There are many examples – Stansted Airport to take an early one – where a performance based 
approach showed that common-sense dissatisfaction with the application of prescriptive regulations 
could be formalised in convincing scientific terms [53]. Performance based design draws credibility 
from the way that it uses fire safety knowledge to produce solutions that are scientifically rigorous 
and based on ‘hard data’. In this way, various challenges and solutions can be quantified and trade-
offs can be assessed for a range of potential fire scenarios. However, quantification and calculation, 
if used without sufficient judgment, can result in a spurious appearance of precision. 
Fire safety professionals must therefore look beyond elegant engineering solutions, and beyond 
the need to gain regulatory approval judged against possibly unquantified performance metrics [8, 
54-56]. High levels of professional ethics and competence are essential, precisely because of the 
limits of fire safety knowledge and the need for judgment in its application. The efficacy of 
performance based fire safety design solutions thus rests not just on the claim that fire and smoke 
dynamics, structural outcomes, and human behaviour are sufficiently well understood by the technical 
community, but also that the specific designers and approvers are interpreting and using this 
knowledge competently and appropriately. It is thus necessary to look not just at the role of social 
relations in how fire safety knowledge is used, but also at how ‘the social’ affects the way that 
knowledge is created and verified.  
4.0  PART III: GENERATION AND APPLICATION OF FIRE SAFETY ‘KNOWLEDGE’ 
4.1  (Regulatory) testing 
Considered from a historical viewpoint a sociology of knowledge approach cannot help but note that 
much fire safety knowledge is (quite rightly given the need to reduce fire casualties and damage) the 
product of pragmatic social requirements rather than ‘pure’ knowledge-seeking. Many fire testing 
laboratories are direct products of the regulatory process (sometimes established by insurance 
companies or groups of insurance companies), and their activities are geared towards carrying out 
standardized compliance testing to demonstrate regulatory conformance with prescriptive 
requirements, rather than specifically to understand or to generate new knowledge.  
For about a century, fire resistance testing has been performed in furnaces using standard 
temperature-time curves. Calls to standardise such testing came in the 1903 International Fire 
Prevention Congress in London, where both standards and testing were discussed. Edwin Sachs, 
chairman of the British Fire Prevention Committee argued that the term ‘fireproof’ – ‘now 
indiscriminately and often most unsuitably applied to many building materials and systems of 
building construction’ – should be dropped and replaced by ‘fire-resisting’ which ‘more correctly 
describes the varying qualities of different materials and systems of construction intended to resist 
the effect of fire for shorter or longer periods, at high or low temperatures, as the case may be’ [57]. 
Amongst the resolutions agreed by the Congress was one that ‘strongly recommends the 
establishment of testing stations for fire-resisting materials and the adoption of a universally 
recognized method of testing’ [58]. 
The main US standard ASTM (American Society for Testing and Materials) E119 was 
introduced in 1918, and has remained substantially the same since then [59, 60]. Other standards (i.e. 
those used by the Underwriters Laboratories Inc., ISO, and NFPA) are similar in nature. ASTM E119 
uses a ‘fire of controlled extent and severity’ to test the ‘performance of walls, columns, floors and 
other building members under fire exposure conditions’, with performance judged by ‘the period of 
resistance to standard exposure before the first critical point in behavior is observed’ [61]. The 
purpose of such tests is to determine how long materials or components will maintain desirable 
properties such as load bearing, integrity, and insulation when subjected to the standard rate of furnace 
temperature increase. 
The results of such tests have become a key part of building regulation and design. 
Regulations specify, and building control requires, materials or components with ratings of 90 
minutes, 120 minutes, and so on. These performance ratings are determined by controlled tests. For 
example, in ASTM E119: ‘The test method prescribed by the standard exposes a specimen 
(representative of the intended construction) to a controlled fire to achieve specific temperatures over 
a specific period’ [62].  
Standardised tests for fire resistance (and other key properties such as flammability, flame 
spread, etc.) have played an important role in the history of fire safety because they enabled materials 
and structures to be assessed against simple failure criteria and rated comparatively in a way that 
matched the requirements of prescriptive regulation. For example, crude measures of fire resistance, 
such as party walls needing to be two bricks thick (as set out in the regulations that resulted from the 
Great Fire of London), could be quantified into more comparable measures, such as 120 minutes of 
fire resistance. 
Thus calibrated, performance ratings derived from standard testing provided a rough 
functional equivalence metric, and complemented regulation based on prescriptive requirements 
derived from historical events. So long as buildings remained more or less the same with only 
incremental changes then prescriptive requirements that specified performance based on standard 
testing may have been able to provide adequate safety. However, the limitations of such standard 
testing could matter greatly in the context of performance based designs, where claims about 
fundamental fire safety knowledge are used to create engineering solutions with potentially finer 
margins of safety; and where innovation in materials and architecture leads to designs that might lie 
outside the limits of historical ‘evidence’ of acceptable performance. 
One concern with this approach, which is also seen in various other technical fields when they 
are examined using a sociology of knowledge approach, is that some actors involved in fire safety 
may take the results of standardized testing to reflect actual performance in fire. Fire test results have 
become a useful social convention and are central to the building approvals process, and their 
everyday repetition gives them credibility as representing reality, even though expert opinion has 
repeatedly noted that this is not the case and was not what the tests intended. For example, in 1970 
Harmathy wrote that ‘it always must be borne in mind that in a strict sense standard fire endurance is 
not a measure of the actual performance of an element in fire, and, furthermore, that it is not even a 
perfect measure for comparison’ [63]. In 1981 Law wrote that: ‘The standard temperature-time curve 
is not representative of a real fire in a real building – indeed it is physically unrealistic and actually 
contradicts knowledge from fire dynamics’ [64]. 
The difference between the standard tests and real fires is only one problematic aspect of 
testing. There are also questions to be raised about whether the test specimens are sufficiently 
representative of those that will be used in buildings, either because the manufacturer has given 
unusual care to the installation of the tested item, or because the test design is unrepresentative of the 
way that the item will function or perform in real life.  
Comparative fire testing for regulatory compliance will no doubt continue to have an 
important role in standard construction projects that follow prescriptive guidelines. However, it would 
be less open to misinterpretation if performance levels were rated according to physical behaviour 
rather than numbers of minutes. There is thus a need to complement (and perhaps eventually supplant) 
regulatory compliance testing with more realistic testing aimed at characterizing the properties of 
materials and structures rather than rating them [65]. In the absence of other available approaches 
engineers are sometimes forced to put forward performance based solutions that specify component 
ratings such as fire resistance as derived from standard testing as though these reflect true 
performance. The problem is partly that the performance based approach ‘requires engineering data 
that existing test methods… are not currently configured to provide’ [66], and also that the realism 
(or lack thereof) of standardised component testing may not be properly understood by all fire safety 
design stakeholders.  
Despite the sophisticated tools available for fire safety engineering, in some cases it could be 
questioned how much the fundamentals have advanced in recent decades. Not only is much of the 
knowledge used in some aspects of fire safety design largely dependent on regulatory testing, but also 
the design fires used as the starting point for testing and analysis are often algorithmic simplifications 
that represented adequate inputs to simple models, but for ease of use rather than realism, and that 
may be inappropriate for more complex or refined models. 
Although fire safety engineers understandably want usable tools that are good enough, rather 
than excessively detailed, research on the fundamentals is important because in some cases it may 
not be known how to define or indeed measure what it means to be ‘good enough’. To date, much of 
the ‘basic’ research at universities and non-commercial government research establishments has been 
sponsored by industry, and geared towards meeting regulatory testing procedures and norms. 
Traditional fire resistance testing, or other standards such as the more recent Eurocodes [67] for fire 
engineering design, define the epistemological landscape around which many research hypotheses 
are framed. While not losing sight of the pragmatic requirements of the professional world, there is a 
need for knowledge that is untainted by regulatory requirements. Ironically, such knowledge could 
help to build confidence in regulatory practices. 
4.2  First principles fire science and engineering 
Traditional fire safety engineering rested heavily on empirical observation, either from real fires or 
from testing. Data collected enabled inductive inference by which specific evidence from one event 
could be claimed to have general applicability. For example, the regulations resulting from the Great 
Fire of London rested on judgments that the severity of the fire observed was due to the widespread 
use of wood, the lack of fire resistant party walls, too narrow streets, and so on [68].  
Over subsequent centuries the evidence from real fires was supplemented by increasing use of 
testing. However, understanding of many fundamental processes was lacking, and a prescriptive 
regulatory approach based at least partly on direct experience of fire disasters had obvious short-
fallings if innovation in building materials (e.g. plastics and other oil-based materials) called into 
question the validity of much of that experience. Rasbash acknowledged this problem in 1974: 
… we cannot continue to rely on the time honoured method of the past in dealing with fire safety, 
i.e. to rely on experience painfully built up and the passage of decades, if not millennia, for lessons 
to be learned, sink in and acted upon. Direct experience is becoming too painful a teacher and we 
must marshallmarshal our forces to avoid it, if only because of the extensive investments and 
commitments that might be involved before a tell-tale incident occurs and is recognised, and the 
trauma of putting things right afterwards [69]. 
The solution was to improve theoretical understanding so that potential fire safety problems 
could be predicted from first principles. Such a usable fire safety science rested on the increasing 
ability to understand and model key processes. As Emmons put it: ‘By the middle of the 20th century, 
the classical dynamics, the classical quantum chemistry, and the computing machinery had all 
progressed to the point that solutions of the simpler problems of fire science first became possible’ 
[70]. 
This theoretical work was pioneered by figures (to mention a few among many) such as Thomas 
and Rasbash at the Fire Research Station (now BRE) in the UK, Emmons at Harvard, Pettersson in 
Sweden, and Kawagoe at the Japanese Building Research Institute. Academics drawing on this early 
work produced notable textbooks such as An Introduction to Fire Dynamics [71], and Principles of 
Fire Behaviour [72]. And building on these advances in underlying science, the availability of 
sufficient computing power over the last few decades has made the use of Computational Fluid 
Dynamics (CFD) and Finite Element Modelling (FEM) increasingly popular both for research and as 
practical design tools for engineers. 
In particular, the move towards to performance based design rests partly on a claim that fire 
safety knowledge is sufficiently advanced to enable deterministic or quantifiable stochastic modelling 
of fire behaviour and its effects on structures. Advances in CFD have led to a number of models that 
can now be used to predict fire and smoke behaviour. These models are based on fundamental 
physical understanding but rest on a large number of assumptions that may be opaque to unskilled 
users. 
However, because of the limited data available from realistic fire tests, much of the real-world 
validation of these models has depended on data that has been collected either through regulatory 
testing methods (widely acknowledged as unrealistic in some respects) or, where fire safety research 
is independent of regulatory drivers, small scale laboratory tests. Laboratory testing can be done in 
ways that emphasise knowledge rather than regulatory conformance, but there is still ‘difficulty in 
extrapolating data from bench scale type tests to large scale events’ [73]; large-scale tests are rare 
because they are difficult and expensive to perform. 
Amongst the most significant of large-scale tests were those carried out at Cardington in the 
1990s [74]. These were made possible by financial support from the steel industry, and originated 
partly due to a serendipitous observation of a real fire at an uncompleted fourteen-storey building at 
Broadgate, London on June 23, 1990. The Broadgate steel structure was only partially fire-protected 
at the time of the fire, but even though the fire burned for several hours and reached temperatures 
exceeding 1000oC, no collapse of the structure was observed [75]. 
Prior to Broadgate, the regulatory approach to the use of steel (based on furnace tests) was to 
protect (insulate) steel elements of a building so that their temperature would not exceed a certain 
value, typically about 550oC, in a fire. To achieve this, passive protection needed to be employed to 
protect the steel, and this added to construction schedules and costs [76]. The Cardington tests 
provided crucial evidence for the use of performance based structural fire safety design approaches 
because it enabled the interrogation of the structural performance of specific structural designs in 
credible fire scenarios, thus facilitating innovative architecture, and also making steel buildings more 
economically competitive. 
Although the Cardington study was generally taken to show that steel did not require the levels 
of fire protection enshrined in prescriptive regulations, the response of steel structures in fires remains 
incompletely understood. Despite major advances in both understanding and capability, a 2007 
survey noted: 
The general conclusion that can be made from this work at this stage of research in structural fire 
engineering, the behavior (temperature, strength, failure) of a structural steel beam in natural fire 
conditions cannot be fully predicted by the calculated methods provided in the literature [77]. 
Another recent large-scale fire test provided evidence of the limited predictive power of CFD 
models (or perhaps of CFD model users) as regards fire growth in a compartment [78]. In 2006 a 
series of tests was performed in an unoccupied, and soon to be demolished, tower block in 
Dalmarnock, Glasgow. Two flats were instrumented, furnished realistically, and then fires initiated. 
In one (Fire Test One) the fire was allowed to progress to post-flashover, whereas the other involved 
earlier intervention. A particularly interesting aspect of these tests was that seven different research 
groups were all given the same starting conditions for Fire Test One and asked to blindly model its 
subsequent behaviour. The results varied widely. When looking at the Heat Release Rate (HRR) for 
instance, one simulation provided ‘a reasonably good prediction’, with another 100% over, and the 
rest under-predicting the HRR ‘in the range of 30-90%’ [78]. It was concluded that ‘current modelling 
cannot provide good predictions of HRR evolution (i.e. fire growth) in realistic complex scenarios’ 
[63]. Doubts about the consistency of results obtained by CFD model users were also highlighted by 
a recent round-robin exercise carried out at Lund University [79]. 
One might therefore ask whether the future predicted by Emmons [70] has been realised. In 
1984, but writing as if from around 2250, he noted that: ‘The first performance fire codes were not 
enacted until the year 2000 which was as soon as the knowledge of fire and the accumulated empirical 
fire data made general building fire predictions sufficiently accurate’ [70]. There is no doubt that fire 
safety science has made considerable progress over the last half century. Whether predictions based 
on this science are ‘sufficiently accurate’ for engineering purposes is a matter of judgment, depending 
on the context, the extent to which safety margins are applied, and the specific phenomena in question. 
Moreover, the ability to make good judgments about predictive reliability depends on good 
understanding of both the strengths and weaknesses of the underlying science.  
A potential concern here is that social distance from the process of knowledge production may 
actually increase belief in the reliability of that knowledge. Other social studies of technology have 
suggested a phenomenon described as the ‘uncertainty trough’ in which users of a technology may 
be more convinced of its reliability than the technology’s creators (or the more distanced public on 
which the technology impacts) [80]. Thus, those who build CFD software tools, and who have done 
the research that underlies them, are likely to have more limited confidence in their predictive ability 
than those who use and experience these models in the building approvals process. Although the 
evidence is anecdotal, there is a concern (within various engineering professions, including fire 
safety) that the visual outputs of simulation models may have improved out of proportion with the 
quality of the physics underlying the models themselves. Practitioners (and approvers) may be 
impressed, for example, by the apparent ability to model the movement of fire and smoke through a 
building, without fully understanding the assumptions and limitations of the models that generated 
the outputs.  
In addition to the uncertainties associated with understanding how fire and smoke spread, and 
how buildings respond to fire, there is the considerable challenge of predicting how people behave. 
Human behaviour, particularly as regards evacuation of buildings, can be modelled, but there is a 
divergence of opinion about some of the assumptions underpinning these models, and particularly 
about the quantity and quality of the empirical data on which such models are based [81]. The extent 
to which evacuation models can provide a quantified representation of what would actually happen 
in a fire remains somewhat unknown; as a recent survey of evacuation modelling of high-rise 
buildings noted, ‘few validation studies have been performed, mainly because of the lack of real 
world data available’ [82]. It is clear that, whilst massive progress has been made in all of these areas 
in recent decades, a great deal of further research and education is needed.  
Thus, all areas of knowledge that are central to fire safety engineering are characterized by what 
have previously (and infamously) been termed ‘known unknowns’, but it is not clear that all 
practitioners are fully aware of, or reflexive about, the limitations of their understanding. Moreover, 
there are undoubtedly some ‘unknown unknowns’, and while these are by definition unpredictable, 
the potential for unforeseen fire safety failures should (and in many cases does) give pause for 
reflection. Although in many respects fire safety knowledge has improved greatly over the last few 
decades, it remains imperfect, constructed not from purely objective facts but rather from the 
collective judgments of experts from a range of disciplines working in particular organizational, 
commercial, and political contexts. 
5.0  CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 
Fire safety has come a long way in the last fifty years. Advances have been made in 
understanding many of the fundamental processes of fire and smoke dynamics, as well as the 
structural responses of buildings to fire, and fire safety engineering has emerged as a unique, specialist 
profession. Thanks to improved knowledge, better engineering, and appropriate regulations, fire 
deaths are at their lowest level in living memory in many parts of the world. However, it is important 
not to be complacent, and not only because many other regions still suffer from comparatively poor 
levels of fire safety. Even where fire deaths are low, and where there appears to be little societal 
demand for improvement, it is important to be aware of the risks as well as the benefits that come 
with innovation in both technology and regulatory practices. New materials and building techniques, 
along with societal changes, can create new challenges and – as New Zealand’s ‘leaky buildings’ 
episode shows – regulatory innovation can misfire [83].  
This paper has highlighted a range of sociological issues related to fire safety, some of which 
can be considered as ‘classical’ sociological issues, such as the factors associated with the social 
context and socio-economic determinants of fire safety risks, and human response to fires. However, 
the main focus of this paper follows a ‘sociology of knowledge’ approach that seeks to unpick the 
processes by which fire safety knowledge is generated and used by the fire safety professions to 
ameliorate outcomes when unwanted fires do occur. This is a central concern for fire safety 
engineering because the profession draws on disparate sources of knowledge. Evidence can be 
gleaned from population-wide statistics that show correlations; from investigations of major fires that 
are seen to reveal specific deficiencies; from laboratory experiments and a few large-scale tests that 
are necessarily unlike ‘real’ fires; and from first principles calculations and simulations. Best practice 
in terms of knowledge and its application is thus a social construct comprising the latest consensus 
view of the fire safety community, amalgamating knowledge across different technical domains, and 
which not only evolves over time, but may also vary according to local practices and whom is 
considered a qualified member of that community.  
 The application of improved fire safety knowledge in performance based approaches to fire 
safety engineering poses particular challenges for regulatory mechanisms. There is the issue of 
whether regulators can be expected to have sufficient understanding to appraise proposed fire safety 
solutions, or whether fire safety engineers should more actively seek the status of a profession that 
regulates its own performance. Either way, there is a need for quantifiable knowledge claims about 
fire safety performance so that fire safety engineers can confidently justify design decisions, and, in 
cases where things go wrong, be held to account.  
At present what is called performance based design covers a variety of activities, sometimes 
carried out in a piecemeal manner in a regulatory environment that (in many jurisdictions) remains 
largely prescriptive in practice (despite the theoretical freedom stated in written regulations). A key 
requirement for the more thorough-going application of first principles fire engineering solutions is 
a knowledge base untainted by reliance on regulatory testing, and a widely-accepted methodology 
for translating societal expectations of fire safety into quantitative measures of adequacy. 
However, there may also be cause for concern if the underlying philosophy of performance 
based solutions imbues undue confidence in ‘efficient’ engineering solutions. Although the coarse 
requirements of prescriptive design rules may have led to complicated or unscientific rules that inhibit 
innovation, it is generally assumed that in most cases they embody a considerable margin of safety. 
Replacing this prescriptive approach with fire engineering based on the rational use of the latest 
scientific knowledge offers considerable benefits, but might also create risks if the resulting fire safety 
solutions are too finely tuned or poorly regulated. The result may be that some fire engineered 
solutions are not robust in the face of the practicalities of what happens during the construction and 
life-time use of buildings. 
This paper suggests that there is the potential for further improvement in this field – despite 
comparatively small losses and a low societal perception of fire risk – and that these improvements 
are best addressed if social and technical variables are considered together. Fire safety science and 
engineering ought to be, simultaneously, both more and less social. On the one hand, the great 
significance that human behaviour has for the use and up-keep of fire safety features points to the 
need for research that considers how to ensure that buildings are constructed, used, and maintained 
in a manner intended by their designers – or perhaps to ensure that they are designed in such a way 
as to make their use and maintenance requirements realistic given social interactions with fire safety 
technology.  
On the other hand, there is also a need for ‘pure’ basic research, unpolluted by regulatory 
devices such as the standard fire tests and compliance testing, to further develop the scientific 
knowledge and engineering tools necessary to design a fire-safe built environment to achieve 
quantified and agreed levels of performance. Finally, there is a need to quantify the socially 
acceptable ‘levels’ of safety across building types and occupancies, such that both the core science 
and the social application of fire safety knowledge can be directed to achieving the best possible 
outcomes. 
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